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The problem-situation: history and theory; 'civil' and 'uncivil' kinds of social capital 1 For a liberal democracy to function with the active participation of its citizenry and for a market economy to work properly a number of institutional and cultural conditions have to be met. It is contended that 'social capital' is one of them, and that a deficit of social capital in Western societies leads to a malfunctioning of their polities and their economies. Thus, following on work by James Coleman (1990) , 2 Robert Putnam has recently made social capital a fashionable term, and affirms that it is diminishing in the United States (Putnam 1995) , and possibly in other countries. 3 However, the term of social capital needs some clarification, and the assumption of social capital's benign effects on liberal societies should be drastically qualified. The term denotes a combination of norms and networks of cooperation and sentiments of trust that may be of quite different character, and serve in fact quite different functions in the larger society. In this essay, I will propose a distinction between two very different kinds of social capital that may exist, between a civil and uncivil social capital, and I will explore the effects that these may have, with reference to developments in Spain over the last sixty years. But first a few words are in order on the problem-situation that frames these questions, in both its historical and theoretical dimensions.
To begin with, I think that the discussion should not be dominated by an immediate concern about the survival, or the demise, of the Western-type of welfare state and organized capitalism, but rather understood within a larger spatial and temporal framework. Western liberal societies are living in a post-totalitarian period and learning to live with a market economy characterised by globalization, (partial) deregulation, privatization and, so far, a large wave of prosperity. Welfare reform and the demise of 'organized capitalism' (by the state and corporate institutions) are part of this learning experience, and there is no way that people attached to these (transient) institutions can avoid a sentiment of malaise. Understandably, people affected by this malaise will tend to dramatise events and to think that the social fabric is being torn apart and social cohesion diminishing as they see the social compromises of the past being revised. As they wonder why the parties, the unions (and other professional associations) and the churches which made them lack, now, the will and the ability to uphold them, and as they point to people's detachment from these formal associations as one of the reasons for it, they may find in phrases such as "social capital is diminishing" a fitting statement to their anxieties.
However, an alternative view is to consider this malaise as merely another symptom of the birth pangs of a long transition towards a relatively homogeneous European-wide and worldwide socioeconomic space and, therefore, to take a more positive attitude towards it. Instead of seeing the expansion of the market economy as an overwhelming process of 'commodification' of the world (with the negative connotations of 'alienation' and 'fetishism' attached to it), we may consider it as possibly a step forwards to an order of liberty and the type of social cohesion that goes with it, provided we learn how to adapt to it by looking to new forms of association or giving a new look to the old ones, and provided we take it as an opportunity to redefine solidarity.
Such a process of practical adaptation has to take place country by country and to take root in particular traditions: in Western Europe, for instance, in the traditions of the liberal (AngloSaxon), social-democratic (Scandinavian) and Christian-democratic (continental) welfare systems of the last hundred years. As Fritz Scharpf has suggested, there may be a diversity of solutions to the problem of adjusting the European welfare systems to the international integration of product and capital markets (and in time, we may add, to that of labor markets), depending on the policy legacy and the local institutional (and cultural) constraints of the different countries (Scharpf 1999) . At the same time, however, each country may learn from others' experiences, try what looks successful elsewhere, mix the components of various traditions, and end up with hybrid institutions and complex justifications for what she will do. Thus, solutions, once they have been found in one country, can be transmitted to others by means of cultural diffusion, translated into the local moral discourse and adjusted to local circumstances, the result being that diversity may be compatible with a convergence of sorts. 4 This process should go hand-in-hand with the development of a theory of social capital that makes a clear distinction between different types of social capital as they are related to different forms of solidarity, and that also explores the linkages of this theory with the classical problem of social integration in modern societies. This is what I attempt to do in this essay, by stressing the distinction between 'civil' and 'uncivil' kinds of social capital, and by doing so with reference to a theory of civil society.
I am interested in the process of transformation of each kind of social capital into its opposite, as a given society goes through several historical stages: Spain, in particular, went from a civil war to a liberal democracy through an authoritarian experience. In doing so, I have found Putnam's focus on norms and networks of cooperation and sentiments of trust to be useful, but I am unsatisfied with the general tendency to reduce 'networks' to a social fabric of formal associations, as well as to take verbal statements of trust or lack of trust (in people or in institutions) in answers to questionnaires as the main basis for assessments of the moral dimension of social capital. By contrast, a broad concept of networks would include what I call soft forms of sociability (such as families and family-centered networks, peer-groups and fiestas). For the same token, I am interested in actual behavior as an embodiment of tacit statements regarding attitudes, values and norms; and, at the same time, I feel it indispensable to look (at least, to a point) into the discourses of justification and the ideational contents attached to the various types of social capital. Finally, I think that some attention should be given to the role that the economy and politics play in these developments.
'Civil' and 'uncivil' kinds of social capital
The networks, rules and sentiments that social capital is composed of come to exist in diverse ways, and their effects vary depending on the type of social capital that we refer to. In general terms, it is impossible to imagine any stable social grouping without social capital of one sort or another, without bonds of trust and rules of cooperation. Microsocieties (families) and macro-societies (nations) alike cannot do without it; and of course, even groups such as Mafias, patriarchal families subject to a despot and totalitarian parties all have social capital of a certain kind. The point is, what kind or type of social capital is it?
For many, this has been, and is, linked to the general problem of social integration, which is the defining problem of sociology as an academic discipline. Solutions to it have always remained sensitive to the changing character of the problem as it applies to 'traditional' and to 'modern' societies, and the transition from one to the other, and, in this 4 An argument suggesting a limited convergence around the recognition of the four pillars of the welfare system (families, the state, profit and non-profit organizations), and around a blend of liberal and communitarian arguments, in Pérez-Díaz, Chuliá and Álvarez-Miranda (1998) . 5 The assessment of the role of politics is a matter of balance and of empirical research. Thus, Putnam suggests that social capital is related to a tradition of civic engagement (or participation in the affairs of the city), and believes he has found a such a tradition, based on social capital, in the civic humanism of the cities of northern Italy, in contrast with those of the South. Though this is not the place to discuss the Italian case, a word in defense of Putnam against some of his critics is in order here. It may well be that Putnam leaps to conclusions about the Middle Ages, contemporary times and the connections between them, and that he does not pay sufficient attention to the influence of the state (and the political class) and the economy in the formation of social capital as Sidney Tarrow suggests (following Cohn and others : Tarrow 1996) . It is obvious, anyway, that any attempt to explain a phenomenon as complex as that of the Italian case requires careful consideration of those political and economic factors. However, such criticism may prove tangential to Putnam's central theoretical concern, which is the role of social capital, when it comes to explaining a tradition of civic engagement. We could even be led astray by this criticism were it to result in the reduction of social structure and culture (networks and norms as well as sentiments) to becoming merely byproducts of political and economic factors, thereby reducing a large part of the tradition of sociological debate on the problem of social integration to irrelevance.
paper, I will tackle the issue form the viewpoint of a theory of civil society.
The ideal character of a civil society sensu lato 6 is a hybrid, composed of (in Michael Oakeshott's terms) a 'civil association' and an 'enterprise association' (or a 'nomocratic order' and a 'teleocratic order' respectively; Oakeshott, 1990) , though with a bias towards the 'civil association'. But the kinds of trust and solidarity appropriate to these two orders are different.
On the one hand, there is the kind of trust typical of markets, voluntary associations, open public spheres, relationships with limited, responsible public authorities subject to the rule of law, and plural societies. It is the trust appropriate to a community of free individuals who abide by the rules of individual conduct and of mutual respect and reciprocity which are required for the formation of spontaneous orders (Hayek 1976) . On the other, there is the kind of trust appropriate to a community of individuals united insofar as they are associates in a collective action with a common objective, and subordinate to a public authority insofar as it directs them in that action.
Likewise, Friedrich Hayek, arguing in a similar manner, insists that the sentiments and learnt traditions of altruism typical of small groups or families (microcosms) are different to those typical of extended orders (macrocosms). Thus, the solidarity of the small group presupposes a relatively large measure of agreement among its members as to the objectives of the group and the methods for achieving them. This solidarity is of fundamental importance to a small group of people with similar habits; but it makes no sense when the problem consists of adapting to unforeseen circumstances. This is exactly the problem which necessitates the very different form of social coordination of the extended orders (Hayek 1989: 19) based on rules, not on common ends (given that those ends will unite a complex society only in times of crisis).
The kind of altruism applicable also varies. In the small group, altruism is what corresponds to the shared purpose of attending to the visible needs of companions or those whom one knows personally. But "the morals of the market lead us to benefit others not so much because we are oriented towards doing so intentionally, but because these morals induce us to act in such a way that this will be the effect which follows on from our actions", so that "the extended order makes our efforts altruistic in their effects" (Hayek 1989 : 81) (and, therefore, offers the possibility for each one of us to add the intention to the effect).
When it comes to connecting these two kinds of sentiments and morals, Hayek confines himself to offering some possibly prudent, but certainly very vague, advice: he warns us that if we apply the rules of microcosms to macrocosms, we will destroy the extended orders; but if we do the opposite, we will wipe out the microcosms. And he suggests that we learn the art of living in both worlds at the same time.
Rather than taking this recommendation at its face value, I feel it invites us to move on to questions at the heart of the discussion of social capital: is it necessary to combine the two morals which are in operation here, and how could it be done? On the one hand, we have the morals (and sentiments, and networks of social relationships) of the extended orders, which should prevail in a civil society due to its bias favorable to a 'civil association' united by rules. This is where the morals of the economic markets (with their underlying morality of trust in the fulfillment of promises, and of a principle of reciprocity being applied to mutually beneficial exchanges), and the morals of the markets of intellectual and scientific debate, belong. On the other hand, we have the various morals of the 'associations as enterprise' or, in other words, of "small groups" or "tribal groups" (in a very large sense). Among the latter we find family morality, the morals typical of voluntary associations, (for example, the unions, or the firms), the moral feelings typical of local (provincial, regional) or religious, or ethnic solidarity; and also a national moral, or that of society 'as a collectivity' (in Talcott Parsons' terms: Parsons 1967), be it national or plural.
These "tribal" morals may be compatible or incompatible with a civil society. This means that, while the morals of open or abstract societies imply the presence of a social capital of a civil kind, "tribal" moralities (and the corresponding networks 6 For the distinction between a broad understanding of 'civil society' (the original Scottish view; see also Gellner 1994) , and a more narrow or restricted use of the term (close or equivalent to the 'third sector' of non-state and non-profit associations) see .
of cooperation and sentiments of trust) have, in this regard, much more ambiguous implications.
The point can be further elaborated by going back to the theories of Émile Durkheim (1967 Durkheim ( [1893 ) on mechanical solidarity as typical of segmented (and 'traditional') societies, and organic solidarity as typical of modern societies, and to Parsons' comments on this (Parsons 1967) . Parsons believes that in Durkheim's thought (and within the tradition of that thought, in which he places himself), organic solidarity is not simply opposed to mechanical solidarity. Correcting or developing Durkheim, Parsons goes on to suggest that the organic solidarity typical of a highly differentiated society, in which exchanges usually take the form of exchanges in markets (or in extended orders), needs to be complemented by mechanical solidarity. For Parsons, the norms underlying these exchanges should be institutionalized (including mechanisms for sanctions and enforcement) and internalized. Enforcement involves some definition of the boundaries of society as a collectivity (with its rules of membership), some common goals, and a government which attends to them and guarantees fulfillment of the norms by the use of force (if necessary). In turn, the internalization of norms involves a socialization process and a common culture, that is to say, beliefs and sentiments which are shared by members of the society.
In my view, Parsons carries his reasoning too far, on the basis of two (related) assumptions. Firstly, he believes that society as a collectivity requires its members to share nothing less than a conception of the ideal society that they desire: a common definition of what 'a good society' consists of (Parsons 1967: 8) . Parsons's position seems excessive and inappropriate for a plural society in which it is to be hoped (and desired) that people with very different visions of what 'a good society' should be, would be able to compare and contrast their points of view and show reciprocal toleration. Likewise, it seems to imply an overly robust state or government, whose main role would be to steer society towards collective goals coherent with that supposedly shared (and why not unanimous?) vision of the ideal society. Secondly, Parsons understands that those feelings and beliefs, or supreme values, are related to the norms applicable to different sectors of society, its diverse collectivities (with less scope) and to individuals (in their social roles, as Parsons points out), in such a way that the norms must be systematically subordinated to these supreme values. However, this vision seems to imply an interpretation which is too rigid and not sufficiently plausible of what is to be hoped and, especially, what ought to be hoped from social integration in an open society.
Of course, if collectivities were to adhere to definitions of a 'good life' that are incompatible with one another together with the urge to impose their views on others, it would be a recipe for civil war, as the Spanish case will show. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the existence of quite divergent, and even contrary, world visions, and different versions of what a 'good society' means in a modern, complex society. The point is whether they can co-exist with each other, and for this what is needed is not a set of common substantive values but just procedural rules.
Having said this, it must be recognized that Parsons is right both to insist on the need for accommodating both kinds of solidarity, and to express interest in the possible positive effects of mechanical solidarity on the integration of societies of extended orders. This leads him to underline the importance of rituals, which are dramatizations of people's commitments to values which they all share when it comes to expressing and reinforcing (mechanical) solidarity in modern societies.
I must add that this reference to the importance of ritual gives us a clue to the interesting phenomenon of the difference in intensity of feelings of solidarity relative to the extended orders (and organic solidarity) and those relative to the collectivities (in Parsons' language) or small groups (bands or tribes sensu lato, in that of Hayek). Experience suggests that, normally, feelings are only intense if they refer to a particular object; if they are 'particularistic'. Feelings of mechanical solidarity are those relevant to the family, and to collectivities like the tribe, the ethnos, the church, or even the nation; all of which can be perceived, in a manner tinged with affections, as the equivalents of huge families. This means that members can feel as if they have quasi-familial ties with them (like patriarchal or matriarchal macro-families, or macrobrotherhoods). The quasi-familial bond facilitates the transmission of feelings of (mechanical) solidarity from the family group in the strict sense towards much wider groups. Thus, in the classical accounts of Mediterranean societies, the seamanmerchant who, as a stranger, arrives in a community to trade, is accepted in it on the basis of his adoption as guest, client or member of the household of whoever is to be his protector, patron and guarantor before the community; and it is through this almost familial hospitality that the stranger achieves some form of vicarious 'membership' of the community (Pitt-Rivers 1977: 94ff.) .
Hence, the most usual sentiment appears to be love (or hatred) of what is closest to us and it gradually extends outwards in a series of enlargements that preserve some part of their original 'familial' nature. Hypothetically, this feeling could come to encompass the whole human race, like 'one giant family' in the imagery of the great universal religions. (Indeed, the media know that the best way to appeal for solidarity with the suffering of people in the third world is, for example, by making the exotic appear domestic. This is accomplished by the immediacy of a scene in close-up on television, so that the 'protagonists of the news item' can burst into the intimacy of the home, sit down at the table, or in an armchair in the sitting room, and become, for one moment, parts (members) of the family community.) The other side of the coin is that the kind of solidarity required, above all others, by the extended orders does perhaps exclude feelings which are too intense: it requires 'weak ties' (Granovetter 1983 ) which allow and promote the fluid circulation of information in all possible directions, and which facilitate contacts between all sorts of people.
This finally brings us to the complex and potentially contradictory role that the diverse forms of religious life can play with respect to the social integration of modern societies. While Parsons (and Durkheim) emphasize the link between ritual (religious or otherwise) and the mechanical solidarity of society insofar as the latter is a particular, circumscribed collectivity, Hayek is more interested in the link between the universal religions and society insofar as the latter is part of the extended orders. Both approaches tend to overlook the negative effects that religions can, and indeed frequently do, have: the reinforcement of tribalism against the extended orders, and the rupture of social solidarity when it falls victim to religious enthusiasm.
In other words, nations may behave in a civilised or an aggressive manner; religions may be tolerant or intolerant. Therefore we end up not only with a distinction between organic and mechanical solidarities, but also with a distinction within the latter, between the kind of (mechanical) solidarity which is compatible with a civil society, and the kind which is not. I consider this entire period as a drama with the plot unfolding in three acts, or three historical phases. My point of departure, or Act I, is a moment of 'zero solidarity', or, in other words, a moment of the apotheosis of social capital of an uncivil character. This moment is the Spanish civil war of the 1930s, an event that can be interpreted as the antithesis of a 'civil society'. However, I also consider that the kind of social capital prevailing in the society that emerged from the war, the victor's world (which was a phase of political repression, economic autarchy and social isolation, at least during the 1940s and early 1950s), to be similar in nature to that of the war itself. Act II is a period of fast economic growth, intense sociocultural transformations, and partial liberalization that stretches from the mid-fifties to the mid-seventies. In the second act, the plot untangles with a change towards a more civil type of social capital, which coexists with the kind inherited from the war but builds the stock from which the democratic transition will draw in the final phase. Thus in Act III, Spain follows the normal path of Western societies, combining a relatively advanced market economy with the institutions of liberal democracy.
There is perhaps a tendency to start most analyses of social change of Western societies in the 1950s, disregarding World War II as well as its aftereffects. These analyses therefore concentrate on two periods which are differentiated, grosso modo, by the political turbulence of the late 1960s (the reactions to the Vietnam War and the events of May 1968, among others) and the economic crisis of the early 1970s. They refer to societies which constitute relatively well integrated national communities that operate in a market economy and under a liberal democratic polity. Finally, they overlook earlier phases of participation in foreign (or civil) wars, or under the rule of authoritarian regimes, from which some of these societies have emerged.
Personally, I doubt that we shall be able to understand capitalist democratic societies in the postwar period if we ignore their point of departure; that is, the Second World War, the civil wars, and either the authoritarian regimes or, alternatively, the interclass pacts of the time. In other words, we can not understand these societies without considering the socio-genesis of the particular type of social capital that developed during that period and became manifest in the following one (for example, the social capital of the American generation of World War II: Schudson 1996) . In the case of Spain, I certainly cannot overlook that previous phase, in which the two distinct types of social capital that I referred to in the first part of the paper came to the fore. I therefore analyze the process of development of social capital in Spain as if it were a dramatic sequence, and my mixture of analysis and narrative is structured in three acts.
The Civil War
As a fratricidal experience, the Spanish Civil War was the apotheosis of mistrust, the breakdown of a community and, as a consequence, the destruction of social solidarity. At the same time, it was the apotheosis of 'tribal' solidarities within each of the two sides. Of the two types of social capital, organic solidarity went 'out of the window'; while mechanical solidarity blossomed and flourished.
It must be remembered that the Civil War is not only the point of departure for the accumulation of social capital as seen from the scientific observer's point of view when looking back from a later point in time. It has in fact been a crucial reference point in the collective imaginary of the agents involved in the process in every one of its phases. Their political narratives, their institutions and their social practices have all been influenced by the memories of that war, as well as by the intermingling of those memories with diverse normative feelings and propositions. The war is not only the point of departure but also the crucial formative experience of several generations. It pertains to the way they created their social capital and inverted that capital in shaping their civic engagement, and their reasons for doing so. For instance, for the leaders of the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in the mid-seventies (born, most of them, between 1930 and 1950) the Civil War became, in an explicit and ostensible manner, the basic negative referent for their decisions. It was a counter-example to be overcome and avoided. That is why what they preached was primarily consensus, reconciliation and a plan for 'building together' the country and its institutions.
The Civil War involved two adversaries motivated by intense reciprocal hatred, but each containing an important social capital. By the time the war started (after a period of intensification of sociopolitical and cultural conflicts in the preceding years), neither of them was pervaded by a social capital of the 'civil society' type. Though we must be aware of nuances on each side.
On the side of those who called themselves 'the Nationals', several kinds of solidarities, mostly of the mechanical type, were cemented together. Examples include the solidarity of the Church, the Army, the Falangist Party/Movement, and the corporate villages (and Catholic agrarian associations) of the masses of small farmers that supported the Francoist army in the northern half of the country. There was also the solidarity of a business milieu prone to come to an understanding with an interventionist and protective state, and opposed to foreign competition and workers' claims. All this brought together the explicit or tacit support of a wide sociopolitical coalition for a statist-corporatist social design, which combined the features of several different historical formations. Such a design was based upon intense national solidarity and dependent on Catholic doctrines and strong links of authority and hierarchy, but it was also based on equality, fraternity and comradeship (among equal neighbors, brothers-in-arms, party affiliates or members of a mystical body). This was the design of a teleocratic order in which activities were supposed to be subordinate to the common good, under the leadership of the state and in alliance with the Church, at least in the field of culture (that is, as regards beliefs, feelings and morals). In this order there was no room for liberal democracy and, at least in principle (if only partly in practice), the market economy was to be subordinated to the common good of the authoritarian state.
On the Republican side, several 'tribes' (or confederations of tribes) can be distinguished against a more complex and colorful background. Tension among them was sufficiently high to bring them, at times, to civil war within a civil war (in Barcelona, May 1937, and Madrid, March 1939) . One of these tribes was the anarcho-syndicalists, whose type of solidarity implied an order without a state (or very little state) in which trade unions and industrial or rural groups imposed their authority on individuals (which drove the sub-tribe of individualistic anarchists to despair). Another tribe was the rather unstable coalition of communists and their socialist allies (led by Francisco Largo Caballero and, subsequently, by Juan Negrín). Their idea of solidarity was built on the image of a social movement led by the hard-core party nucleus imbued with the power of the state, oriented towards a transformation of the social order, and leading to a new collectivist order.
7 Even though these two tribes within the Republican side fought one another, both wished to promote what they called a social revolution, that is, the transition to a collectivist social order under the leadership of a strategic minority (the CNT-FAI [Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores -Federación Anarquista Ibérica] in the case of the anarcho-syndicalists, or the communist party, or the revolutionary socialists).
In their design for a good or desirable society and in the significance given to the expression 'solidarity', both sides involved in the Civil War stood on common ground, although they stigmatized each other, so that the 'Nationals' or the 'right' were labelled as 'rebels' by their enemies and the 'Republicans' or the 'left' were labeled as 'reds' by theirs. However, their visions of a good society shared several common elements.
Both sides considered liberal democracy to be a political system in crisis. It was despised by the nucleus of their leaders, who saw it as a thing of the past, ready to be replaced by another. They thought the same about capitalism or the market economy: it had to be suppressed (from the leftist point of view) or subordinated to the common good and therefore subjected to state surveillance (from the rightist point of view). The Rechtsstaat was to be tolerated or maintained insofar as it was compatible with the grand projects for the transformation of Spain (salvation, regeneration, revolution) that the contenders entertained. Obviously, both parties made eloquent appeals to a moral duty of solidarity, altruism and sacrifice for the community (which we might call 'post-individualistic'...).
During the war, an extraordinary amount of social capital circulated within both camps. The civic engagement of the contenders could not have been greater. Feelings of solidarity within each party were intense, although they could not entirely suppress factional tensions such as those described among the Republicans. Most of the diverse moral codes in use derived from morals of solidarity and civic engagement, and social cooperation networks were tightly knit. It was social capital, of an uncivil kind, pushed to the limits, at its worst.
The levels of affiliation to social and political organizations evidence this plethora of social capital. On the brink of war, membership of the CNT and the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores), the two major anarchist and socialist unions, is estimated to have been around two million, and total union membership may have been as much as 2.5 million if we add on the smaller trade unions. Catholic agrarian associations numbered around half a million people (Linz 1971 ). The Catholic Church had become the center of a network of associations like Acción Católica, the congregations for the worship of the Virgin Mary, Catholic circles, cooperatives, trade unions and savings banks, which included a large part of the social body. The main political parties (conservative, socialist and republican) were mass parties with numerous and enthusiastic followers and very active members. Added to these were the minority parties with growing influence, like the communists and falangists, whose ranks grew extraordinarily just before the war.
The Civil War was not, therefore, the clash of millions of individual 'monads' produced by a previously anomic state, but (to a certain extent, as I shall show later) that of two blocs with intense internal solidarity, even though of an uncivil kind. Their internal solidarity was channeled into murdering a large number of their opponents and to subduing the remainder. Both sides engaged in killing each other for three years (from July 1936 to April 1939), leaving an estimated 500,000 dead out of a population of about 18 million. It is of interest to note that there were two distinct kinds of death: in the front line and in the rearguard. Of the latter, at least 20,000 took place in the Republican area, and we may presume an even higher number in the 'national' area (Jackson 1965; Herr 1974 ).
Most of the deaths in the rearguard resulted from what were called at the time the 'walks' (paseos). As the front advanced, the day's victors would seek out partisans of the vanquished, at home with their families. Armed (falangist, communist, anarchist, etc.) militias or soldiers came to a house, knocked on the door, asked for the man in question and drew him away, telling his wife and children they were just going for a walk. Often he was shot against a wall on the outskirts of town (for example, against the wall of a cemetery for convenience), or in a busy, public spot as a public example. The identification of those selected for these walks was based upon affiliation to an association from which sympathy to the right or the left could be inferred (such as trade unions and professional or religious associations), membership of a political party, engagement in political activity or the previous holding of public office.
In other words, the expression of solidarity on each side came hand in hand with an experience of terror. And the terror was not limited to a minority within each side but became a far more widespread phenomenon aimed at a large part of the population. In fact, electoral results during the Republic show a predominant vote for parties and factions that played a secondary role after the outbreak of war: Catholic conservatives on the right, republicans and moderate socialists on the left. Their leaders acquiesced with the main protagonists of the war but remained as witnesses. The paradigmatic and rather pathetic case of this behavior was the Republican leader, Manuel Azaña. In the critical moment of the spring of 1936 he pretended to take charge of the situation by becoming head of state. In fact he was taking on symbolic preeminence while limiting his responsibility for what was to come, and was already clearly on the way. Therefore, even though the Civil War may be interpreted as the clash between two camps, each with a dense network of cooperation, subjected to intense indoctrination and each sharing morals of (mechanical) solidarity ad intra, this interpretation must be understood in the context of a society in which the majority, whatever its political ideals or sympathies, held comparatively lukewarm political feelings and was probably drawn into (or allowed itself to be drawn into) war. Seen from the perspective of the hard core of each contending side, this was therefore a majority to be watched and intimidated. Such was the role of the paseo.
Consequently, society perceived the experience of the Civil War through three interpretative prisms: the first, held by the hard cores of the two sides, was relatively clear and simple, but the majority of the population oscillated between the other two.
The hard core on each side held a Manichaean interpretation of the war. For those who called themselves Nacionales, it was a matter of 'saving' Spain from the 'evil forces' of separatism, class struggle and atheism. For the left, it was a matter of preserving freedom, justice and the law against the 'evil forces' of the rebel military, reactionary priests and capitalist oligarchy. For the majority of the country that felt little enthusiasm for either one side or the other, the war was a cruel blow which they tried to comprehend in one of two ways: as a Greek tragedy, in which the two Spains inevitably collided after a century of enemity, or as a drama which could have been avoided if the political actors, ultimately responsible for the intensification of conflict in the mid-1930s, had behaved otherwise. The first interpretation of the war was prevalent in the last phase of Francoism, and best suited the interests of the political class and the society of the transition to democracy (Pérez-Díaz 1993; Aguilar 1996) .
After three years of civil war, the two hard cores could be observed dragging a society along behind them which they tried to shape into a dense network of social cooperation and to indoctrinate with exalted (mechanical) solidarity, but which was presumably suffering from increasing fatigue. This would explain the relative enthusiasm and feeling of 'liberation' of the Republican towns when the 'national' army arrived in Madrid and Barcelona at the end of the war (see the testimony of a Catalanist witness, as corroborated by Josep Tarradellas, in Chuliá 1997: 219).
The Spain of the victors, and of the vanquished
On the Spanish stage of the 1940s two parallel but contradictory plots were unfolding, front-stage and backstage. Front-stage, the scene of the victors' triumph was being acted out. Society was organized in a teleocratic manner, oriented towards the goals of national greatness and unity (solidarity), economic state-corporatism and defense of the Catholic faith. The public authority was located at the center of the social order, and came to arrangements with an array of socio-political and socio-cultural forces which had supported it during the war.
The state re-arranged the legal system to accommodate the extraordinary decisions needed to subdue the vanquished: it was a 'state of (political) measures' rather than a 'state of norms' (Massnahmenstaat vs. Normenstaat, Chuliá 1997: 174) . A set of laws (of 1939, 1940 and 1941) provided a legal basis for banning political parties and free unions. There were no firm procedural guaranties, at least until 1941. The government supervised interprovincial traveling and kept the country in a state close to a state of war until 1947. The war finished in April 1939 but 270,000 people were recorded to be held in prison in the December, 84,000 in 1940 and 35,000 in 1945. This had dropped to 16,000 in 1950 16,000 in (CECA 1975 . This was a period of fear that lasted for about ten to fifteen years (more in some parts of the country and less in others; in many cases it continued until the late 1960s; see Fraser 1972) . It left its mark on people's attitudes to politics and dissent even longer. It also filled them with resentment and taught them the bitter 'lessons' to be learnt about the dangers of radical politics, which were transmitted from one generation to the next of the defeated.
At the same time, as complements and assistants to the state, both the Church and the Falangist party made an effort to engulf society. There were priests, monks, nuns and seminarists on the one hand, and social activists on the other: young and not so young people who had the right combination of feelings for heroism and opportunism were encouraged to join the ranks. This was a great moment for Acción Católica and the Congregaciones Marianas, for the Sección Femenina and for Educación y Descanso (Linz 1971) .
Meanwhile, backstage, a very different and more complex scene was being acted out, with three subplots relevant to my argument. First, economic life actually functioned in a mixed regime. The state intervened and regulated abundantly: it controlled prices and salaries, it imposed rigid rules for workers' dismissal, and it required licences for imports and exports, as well as for new industrial investments. But a corporatist structure was also set up between the state and the market, with a network of sectoral arrangements between civil servants and private managers. A few big banking groups became key, dominant players in this framework. In a highly regulated capitalist system, capital circulated through privileged credit channels and an important sector of agrarian products, cereals, was subject to a demand monopoly by the Servicio Nacional del Trigo. Within most economic sectors, patron-client relationships developed. All in all, these conditions led to a not-so-smooth operation of the economy in the semi-autarchy of the 1940s. Second, the Church had great autonomy in managing its associations and designing its own messages although, in the 1940s, the distance separating it from the Francoist state, and the tensions between the two, were barely observable.
Finally, Spain was, at this time, predominantly rural and agrarian, with over 50% of the working population in farming. A majority of this population (though certainly not all of it) lived within the semitraditional structure of the corporate village and the open-field system. Corporate villages remained similar to those of the last third of the previous century, once the corporate village of the Ancien Régime had adapted to the selling-off of community and ecclesiastical lands, the end of seignorial rights and the tithe, and the building of railroads (Pérez-Díaz 1991) . This social structure rested on a type of solidarity relevant to my argument since, first, it combined aspects of organic solidarity with others of mechanical solidarity proper to a segmented society. Life in the village was familistic and locally oriented, but people followed an ethic of honor and good neighbourliness. This clearly distinguished them from the people Edward Banfield observed in Southern Italy at the same time (Banfield 1958) . Second, it did not become fully integrated into a society dominated by church and state. Third, despite its inclusion in the state-controlled economic system of production and distribution of its main product, cereals, it retained its traditional links to relatively open agrarian markets at a regional or national level.
Act II: The great transformation and the emerging forms of civil solidarity (1950s-1970s)
Franco's Spain encompasses not just one historical period but two. A time of apparent stagnation and scarcity (during the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s) was followed by a time of unrest and growth (from the mid 1950s on). This was the result of a variety of socioeconomic and cultural, as well as political, factors since crucial decisions were made at the time to change the rules of the game, and to allow the country to open up to outside influences.
During this period, Spain's politics, economy and culture underwent profound change. There was a new Francoist strategy, a different public sphere and new political actors. The Spanish economy came to be based on the industrial and service sectors (4.7 million people were employed in agriculture in 1960; 3 million in 1975; and only 1.1 million in 1995) (CECS 1996: 196-197) , and it became more open to world markets. Intense migratory processes followed, and most people went to live in cities (40% of the population lived in cities in 1950; 55% in 1970, and 65% in 1991) (CECS 1995: 687) . Life in both rural and urban areas were thoroughly transformed, with new social mores and new forms of religious life. This set of changes was related to the accumulation of two forms of social capital: one was associated with the functioning of extended orders, less heavily regulated markets, greater social mobility and cultural exchanges (all of which implied an increase in society's ability to regulate itself, limits to the public authority and a margin for civic dissidence); and the other was connected to a network of associations and social movements committed to doing some civic work in the public space. This accumulation of social capital (of both kinds) made possible the kind of democratic transition (in the seventies) that was perceived as creating neither winners nor losers: it was like an inverted mirror image of the civil war.
The development of social capital was the result of several factors. Chief among these was a series of political moves which changed the institutional framework of the state-society relationship, the economy and culture. The Francoist state of the fifties had to adapt to the international environment in order to survive. It broke its diplomatic isolation of the forties and, feeling itself more secure, reduced the intensity of its repressive domestic policies. There were 84,000 people in prison in 1940 and 35,000 in 1945; these figures had dropped to between 4,000 and 11,000 in the period 1955 -1970 (CECA 1975 . The last execution for crimes alleged to have been committed during the civil war took place in 1963. The state tried to 'normalize' (or institutionalize) its political regime and to become a Rechtsstaat. This made its activities easier to predict, and opened spaces for social activities of various kinds and for civic dissidence, particularly from the mid-fifties on. By this time, there had been an administrative reform which reduced the discretionary powers of the administration; a law on collective bargaining (Ley de Convenios Colectivos, in 1958) which allowed for direct wage negotiations between entrepreneurs and workers (within limits); and a reform of the Criminal Code which decriminalized strikes (Chuliá 1997 ).
These legislative acts combined with a radical change in economic policy which set the country along a path of increasing liberalization and integration in the European economy (an agreement of association with the European Community was signed in 1970). This change in policy led to economic growth at an annual rate of 7% for the period between 1962 and 1974. Real wages, profits and private consumption went up, as did the resources allocated to the welfare state; a network of public hospitals was built, and the number of university students increased fourfold.
This double strategy of political institutionalization and economic liberalization, with increases in private and public welfare, also brought changes in the way that the Francoist state conceived the basis of its legitimacy. Till then, the state's legitimacy had rested solely on Franco's victory in the war, and the state's claim to be placed (together with the church) at the moral center of a (hierarchical, authoritarian) teleocratic order, that is, one oriented towards common goals. At this time, it attempted to combine that kind of legitimacy with a new one. It appealed to the interests and sentiments of the new middle classes and a working class which were assumed to be feeling satisfied with the results of the economy while appreciating the need for law and order. The state now claimed to be the guarantor of the correct functioning of the economic and legal systems. At the same time, the state initiated limited political liberalization. It allowed independent candidates to stand in the elecciones sindicales (elections for positions on the jurados de empresa, or works councils, in all enterprises with ten employees or more); another law (Ley Orgánica del Poder del Estado, in 1966) cleared the way for public elections of one-fifth of the Francoist Cortes or parliament; there was a law on religious liberty in 1967; and, above all, a new law (Ley de Prensa) putting an end to the censorship of the press. The state took this path in the belief that it could cope with a margin of dissent, because it had to adjust to internal and international pressures, and also because this strategy was consistent with some of its own ideological premises. The ideology of an 'organic democracy' (or corporate democracy, as opposed to a liberal-individualistic one) made it difficult for the state to argue against free elections for some sections of the seats in Parliament, or positions on students' councils (in the universities) and on the jurados de empresa. Being Catholic, the state had to tolerate the autonomy of the Church and Catholic associations, and felt inclined to allow free discussion of civic affairs provided it took place in private spaces. In 1954, Francoist Minister of Information, Gabriel Arias-Salgado put it this way: "a distinction is needed between freedom of expression in the terrain of individual autonomy, and freedom to divulgate this same opinion in the terrain of the common good where it must be submitted to the state's control" (Chuliá 1997: 330) .
The state's decisions to opt for a (pro-Western) foreign policy and to choose Juan Carlos de Borbón for the succession as head of state were consistent with their general strategy. These moves outlined an altogether long-term scenario that, though somewhat ambiguous, indicated a profound transformation of the state itself. The immediate aims of the Francoist state, however, were those of reinforcing its present power base and substantially increasing its legitimacy. It did not achieve these goals. In general terms, the country reacted in a Tocquevillian manner: the more the state reformed itself, the more society pressed for new reforms. For two decades, different groups took advantage of the new institutional framework to increase their social capital, engaging in civic endeavours and exerting pressure on that framework.
During these years we can observe an increase in two kinds of social capital, which seem to reinforce each other: that of the extended orders, and that of 'civil' associations. The result was a virtuous circle which, as social solidarity increased, placed the Francoist state on the defensive. Spain took the path which would lead to the democratic transition and a new constitution, both understood as a sort of apotheosis of national reconciliation.
There was an increase in a diffuse form of social capital, a reservoir of trust, associated with the functioning of the extended orders. Economic growth (per capita income doubled between 1960 and 1975 : Fuentes Quintana 1995 took place in the context of an economy with less state intervention. Between 1964 and 1974 the volume of exports went up 2.6 times and that of imports, 3.2 times (Velarde 1995: 392) . There was full employment of the labor force (mostly of the male population), and collective bargaining was continuous and reached massive proportions. The population went on the move, both abroad (with 1 million Spanish workers emigrating to Europe) and within the country (2 million changed their residence from one province to another). For all sorts of reasons, Spaniards began to go abroad much more often: 1 million in 1959; 4 million in 1966; and 7 million in 1973. Many families became owners of their own homes (50% of families owned their homes in 1960; 63% in 1970; and 73% in 1981) . Many bought a car. There were 67,000 automobiles in 1960 and 492,000 in 1970. Interpersonal contacts and dealings increased. The number of letters and parcels posted rose from 1.1 million in 1950 to 2 million in 1960 and 4 million in 1970. The number of telephones increased from 0.6 million in 1950 to 1.7 million in 1960 and 4.6 million in 1970 (CECA 1975) .
There was also better access to school education and the mass media. Between 1964 and 1974, the number of students in primary and secondary schools went up 1.4 times; in professional schools, 1.9 times; and at university, 4.3 times. The new press law allowed a new kind of press with wider circulation. For an independent periodical with a bent towards social and political reporting like Cambio 16, for instance, sales went up from 20,000 copies in 1972 to 347,000 in 1977 (Chuliá 1997: 443) . Reading of the foreign press went up too. By 1965, according to a survey, one third of people with a university background in Madrid followed the news through the foreign press (Chuliá 1997: 445) . Also, the sixties was the period when television sets started invading Spanish households.
All this depicts a change towards a more marketoriented and mobile society, and one in which social interactions were more frequent and more free, framed by the explicit or implicit rules of individual conduct of an open society.
It seems likely that a large part of Spaniards' behavior (following these changes) was shaped by a morality-mix, at least partly influenced by the legal system. They had acquired a modicum of trust in the regular functioning of the judiciary in most non-political matters: in respect to civil and commercial law, administrative law and labor law (which had a definite bias in favour of workers´rights with regard to dismissal clauses, for instance). They were also influenced by an ethic of reciprocity with various roots and origins (in Christian morality, but also in the traditional ethics of the corporate village; see, for instance, various local studies of the time : Freeman 1970; Brandes 1976; Pérez-Díaz 1972; Kenny 1961; Weisser 1972) . At the same time, these rules were consistent with the workings of vast networks of family and friends, which led to the use of many (semi-private, semi-public) spaces as forums for debates on public matters (as suggested by the New York Times correspondent, Herbert Matthews, in the late 1950s: quoted by Chuliá 1997: 329).
Traditionally, most young people (and not only teenagers) had always been remarkably gregarious, organizing themselves into pandillas or peer-groups in order to go out to bars, dancing and festivities together. However, their margin for manoeuver and self-regulation expanded considerably in the aftermath of the changes of that period. As morals became more permissive, inter-generational and intra-family relationships became somewhat more egalitarian. Parents lost control over young people's moral behavior (more so, incidentally, over their sons than over their daughters); and the latter took advantage of this to enter a more open market of emotional and sexual relationships, particularly in the parts of the country most affected by tourism. Young people responded with greater or lesser enthusiasm to this turn of affairs; not so their more austere critics who were, in fact, a mixed bunch of religious and Francoist conservatives and a new brand of socially-minded civic dissidents. The increasing moral freedom found little favor in their eyes. They criticized the hedonist, consumer society and set about checking its excesses and reforming it.
These years also witnessed an increase in social capital in the form of commitments to various associations: political parties, unions, or religious associations with a marked quasi-political or civic dimension attached to them. The point is, the end result of these associative commitments was not only quite important for preparing the ground for the next historical phase of the democratic transition but was also, somehow, unintended. One of the ironies of the situation was that the explicit intentions of many that joined the associations and took on civic commitments were rather confused: they wanted to contribute to setting up an order of freedom but they were motivated by a collectivist philosophy or project which was contradictory to this very order. However, their actions ultimately favored a nomocratic order, an order of freedom. That is why the social capital they accumulated through their civic and associative undertakings reinforced, in its effects though not always in their intentions, the diffuse social capital linked to the workings of extended orders (which was certainly not the actors' original intention).
In general, the new social movements that emerged within the Church and society (and even from within the Francoist state, as in the case of dissident Falangists) in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s were oriented towards a kind of civic commitment which combined political dissidence and social critique. They were harshly critical of the model of society which capitalism and (in their view, an amoral or immoral) consumerism were giving rise to. Such was the case, for instance, for two dissident groups who came from the Francoist camp, namely, clerics and Falangists.
The victory of the nationalist camp in the civil war reinforced the clerics' traditional disposition to rule over the faithful both symbolically and morally through the administration of the sacraments and their arts in rhetorical persuasion. At this time, they enjoyed a quasi-monopoly in religious supply (and the protection of the state), and were successful in generalizing the imposition of the sacraments (baptism, communion, marriage, and extreme unction or, at least, religious burial). However, rhetorical persuasion was quite another matter.
In the conditions of social change and more individual freedom of the mid-1950s and 1960s, the message that the clerics were trying to communicate had to be adapted to the demand for meaning on the part of different groups in society. And it was affected by internal tension both in terms of beliefs and generations. Older clerics were portraying a post Council-of-Trent religiosity that was militant, imbued with the spirit of a crusade, rooted in memories of the civil war and supportive of the Francoist state. Middle-aged and younger clerics criticized this message in accordance with their view of the rest of the European Church, which was adapting to the modern world. In terms of civic action, this adaptation was manifested in two different ways: that of the clerics allied to Christian Democratic parties and that of the progressive clerics.
A mechanism was at work in this process that consisted of elective affinities and of trial and error. Younger clerics tended to become 'progressive' (in opposition to the moderate middle-aged generation, and to the older one still supportive of Francoism). They found that, being 'progressive', they were more successful in influencing the new generations of workers, students, employees or farmers, that is, their actual or potential flock. The clerics encouraged their associations and joined their movements (taking on the role of advisor or spiritual leader wherever possible). These associations saw themselves as fighters against the 'system' in pursuit of a more fair, that is, more egalitarian, social order, and they put forwards various theoretical justifications of claims of liberty which were partially instrumental and partially substantial (as the expression of a natural right of self-determination). Yet much more important that the theoretical (hybrid, rather confused) justification of these claims, provided to some extent by clerics, was the fact that (clerical and secular) people involved in these movements made effective use of individual freedoms, became accustomed to them, developed dispositions towards exercising them, and linked these habits to resisting the political and ecclesiastical authorities, and to competing regularly with other associations for the support of the masses (competition which had to follow some game rules).
These observations on clerics can be applied to another social segment which distanced itself from the Francoist state, played an interesting role in the formation of an associative fabric in connection with civic commitment, and showed reluctance towards accepting the liberal order: the dissident Falangists. Though, in the forties, the Falange may have appeared to be the key element in the new Francoist regime, even then, it occupied only a subordinate position. It never controlled the ministries in charge of economic matters and soon lost control of those in charge of education and culture, being demoted to the administration of an infant welfare state. Besides, the need for accommodation with the victorious democracies in the Second World War led Franco to demote the Falangists symbolically.
The second half of the fifties saw a revival of the Falangist party in response to their fear of an identity loss, a feeling of nostalgia for their leaders, and an attempt to return to their roots, back to the anti-capitalist critique developed by the founding members. Leading figues in this revival were, on the one hand, Falangists who decided to make use of their control of parts of the welfare state apparatus to compete with other political families in the Francoist regime and, on the other, young Falangists who initiated dissident social movements. The relationship between the two was rather ambiguous. Those within the state lent partial support to an emergent union movement in order to have it as an ally (or as an instrument) against the other political families (considered to be 'conservative' by the young Falangists') that had implemented the new economic policy of the late 1950s. Hence the disposition within the Falange to tolerate some dissidence in the union domain, and in spaces that emerged as a consequence of the extension of the welfare state: in public hospitals and, above all, in the higher education system, which experienced considerable expansion in the sixties, and in which an important student movement developed that provided a training ground for an emergent opposition political class.
In the case of higher education (as in the case of hospital physicians, urban associations, and others), the course of events followed the pattern already analyzed. The core of the student movement was formed by enthusiasts, bearers not only of an antiFrancoist but an anti-capitalist ideology, of a heroic and righteous character appropriate to people aiming at a radical transformation of reality, and the establishment of a fair, egalitarian and 'solidaristic' society (with the kind of solidarity characteristic of segmented societies). However, the practice of freedom, resistance to the authorities, the need to abide by some game rules, tolerance and pluralism within the dissidents' space, and the need to arbitrate compromises beyond this space with more moderate people who formed the bulk of the masses they aimed at mobilizing, called for moderation of the anti-capitalist strategy and encouraged the habits and dispositions that ultimately relegated the collectivistic idearium to the background.
Something similar took place in the union movement, in which there were significant elements of associative fabric, collective action and civic commitment. Economic growth transformed a traditional economy into an industrial and tertiary one (for example: there were 2.6 million industrial workers in 1960 and 3.4 million in 1975) (CECS 1996: 196) . This development was paralleled by a process of urbanization. The concentration in and around the cities of immigrants and workers in industry and in the building and service sectors provided fertile ground for associations and collective action. This ground bore fruit thanks also to less repressive behavior on the part of the state and to the above mentioned changes in the legal framework. Legal changes permitted the election of union representatives in firms, collective bargaining and economic strikes. Works councils (jurados de empresa) had been elected on several occasions since the early sixties. Many of their members belonged to illegal but (for some time) semitolerated unions, of which the main one was Comisiones Obreras (Workers Commissions) created by Catholic, Falangist and Communist activists. Collective agreements eventually covered between four and five million workers yearly. The number of strikes between 1967 and 1973 oscillated between 350 and 1,000 per annum (with a peak of about 1,600 in 1970) These caused a loss of between 2.5 million and 11 million man hours a year (Muñoz et alia 1975) .
The increasing richness of the associative fabric of Spanish society in such different arenas as industrial relations, religion and political dissent went hand-in-hand with the described rise in its exposure to foreign cultural influences and therefore to a more open and tolerant morality. Thus, the simultaneous processes of socio-cultural change and political and economic liberalization set the stage for the turn away from 'uncivil' kinds of social capital to an accumulation of various forms of a civil type, contributing to the forthcoming transition to democracy.
Act III: Liberal democracy, soft forms of sociability and managing structural strains (from mid 1970s to the late 1990s)
The democratic period extends from the first free elections in 1977 (or from a few months after General Franco's death in November 1975) up to the present day. Democracy brought about an enormous change in the institutional framework of Spanish life and, consequently, a change in the conditions of social capital accumulation. (It is for this period, and in some cases for several years prior to this, that we are beginning to have available a reasonable amount of statistical evidence.)
The arrival of democracy was experienced as a chance for national reconciliation and, to some extent, for the re-creation of the community. However, it was hardly a celebration because people were conscious of the difficult compromises required to attain reconciliation. In spite of the socioeconomic and socio-cultural changes in the last twenty years of Francoism, memories of the civil war obsessed the new political class and society, which tried to avoid confrontations that could lead to a similar situation. Thus, once it was clear that democracy was 'the only game in town' after an attempted coup d'état (in February 1981) had been successfully put down, the transition years, grosso modo from 1977 to 1982, were marked by a rhetoric of consensus and the agreement of several political and social pacts. First and foremost among them was the new constitution, which was designed to overcome the difficulties. Three aspects need to be highlighted.
First, the rhetoric of consensus was used almost unanimously, and expressed in an array of symbols and discourses. The figure of the king acquired meaning as a symbol of reconciliation that allowed for a peaceful and agreed transition from the Francoist regime to the liberal one. In the early seventies the Church had already apologized for its partial responsibility in the civil war, in striking contrast with her initial depiction of the war as a crusade against atheism. In the transition period, the Church played an emphatic role as a bona fide intermediary between the different parts involved in the negotiations.
A new center-right party (led by Adolfo Suárez) took over the government after the first free elections, and ruled for several years thanks to the successful transition and its rhetoric of moderation and conciliation. The whole of the political class was speaking this language and, in election after election, Spaniards punished those who dared to use a discourse of confrontation. Something similar happened in the union movement: future works councils elections resulted in the marginalization of unions which emphasized the discourse of class struggle.
Second, the pacts were the result of compromises between the descendants of those in the different camps in the conflicts of the thirties: the right and the left, employers and unions, the church and the secular intelligentsia, the center and the periphery, the military and the civil power. Formal associations (political parties, unions, professional associations, etc.) enjoyed wide support in their social bases and public opinion, and were decisive in bringing about these compromises.
Third, the content of the pacts was the reconstruction of national solidarity, not on the basis of a common project but on the basis of an order of living together, that is, of an institutional framework of the extended orders. The compromise between the right and the left resulted in a constitution that established liberal democracy (in the expectation of a peaceful alternation in government of the right and the left), and in the recognition of the rule of law (with division of powers, and a constitutional court); the compromise between 'civil power' and the military resulted in the submission of the latter to the former and to the constitutional order; the religious compromise resulted in the formal recognition of religious freedom and pluralism, and in the separation of church and state; the compromise between the center and the periphery was crafted as a complex design of a 'state with autonomous communities', that is, a decentralized system with very wide devolution of powers to regional authorities; the socioeconomic compromise (in the constitution and in several social agreements) led to the recognition of the market economy as the basic framework for economic activity.
Taking this as my point of departure, I now follow the path taken by Spaniards in the last twenty years from the viewpoint of social capital. I will analyze the relationship between some of the outcomes of the civic compromises made by Spaniards and their social capital, that is, their norms and networks sensu lato (associations or networks of cooperation, including families). I would like to mention that I regard the outcomes of this compromise as positive, and I see them as indicators of a significant social capital. They are not only the solutions to collective problems but also the demonstration of a capacity to learn to live with structural strains or unsolved collective problems without serious perturbations.
Associations and soft forms of sociability
The political, social and economic changes of the 1950s-1970s may be considered as preparing the way for the additional changes to have occurred since then, which add up to a process of social capital accumulation of the civil type. The most diverse social institutions and networks have undergone changes in their internal game rules, their ideational content and the sentiments of their constituencies that have brought them closer to either organic solidarities or civilized mechanical solidarities.
The point is worth emphasizing, since it has become a commonplace that Spain lacks a social fabric strong enough to promote economic growth, social cohesion, cultural creativity and a liberal polity.
8 Evidence for this diagnosis usually rests on a mix of two kinds of data: on registered affiliations to formal associations, interpreted as suggesting a weak associative network, and on answers to opinion polls, interpreted as suggesting the pervasiveness of sentiments of social distrust. I will back later on the matter of the moral sentiments of the population, and I shall focus first on the available evidence on associative ties.
In general terms, it may be argued that Spaniards seem more prone to participate in informal networks than in formal organizations, thus living together with close and soft types of social connectedness, rather than with larger organizations where individual participation is usually more limited and standardized; and that, in a sense, sociologists and political scientists who have focused on mass organizations, with strong traditions and leaders who coopt each other on a regular basis (such as political parties, trade unions and churches) have quite misunderstood the associative basis of Spanish society, picturing it as individualistic or anomic. It may even further argued that lack of enthusiasm to join large associations with a robust leadership (as it may be assumed to be the case in parties, unions and churches) may go hand in hand with a greater inclination to join associations of another kind, for instance, those we may call 'societal' associations such as those which belong in the non-state and non-profit associations of the 'third sector'.
The fact is, recent studies on the Spanish third sector suggest the picture of a rather robust sector both in absolute and in comparative terms. The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project has estimated that the nonprofit sector in Spain had revenues (without volunteer input) amounting in 1995 to $25.7 billion (Salamon et alia 1999: 480) . This compares well with France, with revenues of $57.3 billion but a Gross Domestic Product of 1,5 trillion dollars (Spain: 559 billions), and with Germany, with revenues of $94.4 billion but a GDP of 2,4 trillions dollars (Pérez-Díaz 1999a: 149). Furthermore, the share of revenue from private giving was considerably higher in Spain (32.1%) than France (7.5%) and Germany (3.4%). By contrast, grants from the public sector accounted for 32.1% of revenues in Spain, 57.8 in France and 64.3% in Germany; and the share of fees and charges was of 49% in Spain, 34.6% in France and 32.3% in Germany (Salamon et alia 1999: 480) .
The Spanish third sector employed 475 thousand full-time equivalent paid workers, or 4.5 percent of all nonagricultural workers in Spain, and 9.8 percent of the adult Spanish population contributed their time to nonprofit organizations (which translated into another 253 thousand full-time equivalent employees) (Ruiz Olabuénaga et alia 1999: 163ff.) . In terms of employment, Spain's figures (4.5% of nonagricultural labor force) are fairly similar to those of Germany and France (4.9%) and Austria (4.5%), below behind those of the Netherlands (12.6%), US (7.8%) and UK (6.2); but above those of Japan (3.5%), Finland (3.0), and other LatinAmerican and Central-Eastern European countries (Salamon et alia 1999: 478) .
Even if we are dealing with a field of research in which reliable statistics and data are slow and hard to come, the estimates of the Johns Hopkins Project suggest an already strong sector of non-state and non-profit associations, and corroborate the general impression of a general trend to grow of a variety of 'societal' associations during the nineties. Against this background, we may consider the Spaniards' low affiliation to parties and unions less as an indication of a low level of involvement in politics and social affairs and possibly more as a conduct influenced by the historical circumstances in which the transition to democracy and the full emergence of unions and economic associations have taken place.
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Party affiliation is very low. A 1980 survey showed an affiliation rate of 6% of the adult population, several surveys from 1985 to 1993 have suggested that the rate had fallen to around 2/3.4% (depending on the estimates: Gunther and Montero 1994; Prieto-Lacaci 1993) . It seems, however, that the main parties have increased the number of their affiliates during the 1990s (Pérez-Díaz 1999a: 137) . Above all, as we shall see, the Spaniards are deeply attached to a political system in which the parties continue to play a crucial role, have a definite influence and a passably faithful electorate.
Unions also have few affiliates. They started, in 1977, with a rate of 27.4% (of the wage-earner population); which had decreased to 11% by 1990. However, the candidates of the two main unions (Comisiones Obreras and Unión General de Trabajadores) have deserved about three quarters of the total vote in works councils elections since the early eighties, are the leaders in the rounds of central and sectoral collective bargaining every year, and occasionally may call for a general strike (sometimes, as in 1988, with astonishing success). Thus, the workers refuse to join the unions, but stand in a complex position towards them: they support them, but their support is limited and largely instrumental (Pérez-Díaz 1993) .
By contrast, Spanish social capital seems to have a stronger base in family networks and other networks of informal cooperation. This is a form of sociability that can be labeled soft, and is characterized by its 'weak ties'. This may include communities of residence of various sorts, which range from corporate or quasi-corporate villages (which conserve some of their traditional traits in many parts of the Spanish countryside), and semiurban and urban neighborhoods, to associations of housing owners in urban condominiums. It includes, also, apparently transient ad hoc communities established around a local fiesta (which combine, once again, traditional and modern characteristics), networks of friends, often of the same age, in conversational communities such as tertulias, or in pandillas, and certainly families(and extended families) and family networks.
There are no statistics about peer-groups or pandillas but, though the statistician may be blind to them, pandillas are quite easy for any casual observer to see (and hear). We do know, however, that they usually play a leading role in sports and sport associations, and festive activities; and, furthermore, that both the playing of sports and the number of fiestas have risen enormously. The percentage practicing a sport was 12% in 1968 and 35% in 1990 (García Ferrando 1990 INE 1994: 748) ; and the number of sports associations increased 4.5 times in the same period (INE 1970: 363; 1996: 325) .
The importance of local festivities has increased extraordinarily in many respects, including the number of participants and activities, the splendor of the proceedings and, of course, the expenditure, with young people almost always at their center. I am referring not only to the big events such as the Valencian Fallas, the Sevillian Holy Week, the San Fermines in Pamplona, or the pilgrimage to El Rocío, but also fiestas in other big or middle-sized cities, and in small villages. (The practice of running bulls à la Navarrese has become particularly widespread, to the despair of animallovers). We have also witnessed the spread of the movida, referring to the groups that walk endlessly from one bar to another and from one discotheque to another all evening and most of the night. This is apparent in all sorts of towns at weekends (loosely speaking, as it often begins on Thursday evenings). Spain has, in fact, the highest number of bars per 9 The authors of the estimates included in the Spanish chapter of the Johns Hopkins Project give only a vague and most general reference to their sources and their proceedings (Salamon et alia 1999: 490) . So far this leaves open to debate the basis of their very estimates, since most of the original sources (particularly the Registers of the Ministry of Interior, and others) are of very poor quality. Their work will have to be corroborated (or not) by further research. See also Mota (1999) , and for some sub-sectors Rodríguez Cabrero and Montserrat, dirs. (1996), and Cortés et alia (1999) . Some work is currently being done to systematically map out the sector of 'social service' associations under the auspices of the Cruz Roja (Red Cross) Foundation and the Ministry of Social Affairs. Increasing interest in societal associations seems corroborated by survey data in the mid 1990s (Orizo 1996) . 10 For an elaboration of this point see Pérez-Díaz (1999a: 16-33) .
head of population, at least in Europe: 9,000 per 100,000 people (Gaviria 1996: 170) but only bars, that conjure up soft forms of sociability, not of alcoholism, that suggests some form of isolation.
As already indicated, the family and family networks are the key institutions in the system of social integration in Spain, and the main component of its social capital. Families deflate the effects of unemployment; they manage and mediate the relationship between their members and the welfare state; and configure the locus where a compromise between generations and genders takes place. It has been argued and amply documented that families constitute one of the pillars of the welfare system in Spain (Pérez-Díaz, Chuliá and Álvarez-Miranda 1998).
The Spanish family keeps its children at home for a long period of time and also cares for its elderly members. Though family size has diminished in recent years, it is still larger than that of most European countries: in 1991, the average household size was 3.3 members in Spain; 2.8 in Italy; 2.6 in France; 2.5 in Germany; and 2.2 in Denmark. Households organize themselves around the family more often in Spain than in other European countries: 81% in Spain; 70% in Italy and France; 59% in Germany and Denmark (Eurostat 1996: 215 ff.) It is very frequent for children to continue living in the family home until well into adulthood: in 1994, 95% of male and 88% of female children aged between 16 and 24 years lived with their parents (as well as 41% of male and 29% of female children aged between 25 and 34 years). This frequency has clearly increased in the last twenty years: among people born before 1960, 11% to 15% of them had left the parental home by their 20th birthday; the corresponding percentage for those born after 1970 is 4.5% (INE 1994: 136-138) . Marriage has been postponed from an average of 26.5 years of age for men in 1975 to 28.3 in 1993; with 23.9 and 26.2 years of age as the corresponding figures for women. Only 19% of those over 65 live alone (with 5% in old people's homes); the rest live with their relatives (Alberdi 1995: 313) .
Spaniards remain in close touch with other members of the extended family: in 1993, 64% of the adult population declared that they had some contact with their relatives every day or at least once a week, but also with neighbors (74%) and with friends who were not colleagues at work (75%). As a result, we can conclude that this is a highly sociable or gregarious society, in which feelings of isolation or loneliness seem rare: in a survey in 1971, 79% of adults stated that they had not had such feelings recently; the same percentage was repeated twenty years later in another survey (CIRES 1992) .
The ideational content: civilizing normative conflicts
The ideational content of the discourse of associations has evolved towards providing normative grounds for less demanding goals, more tolerant attitudes and looser criteria for membership. Families have developed into less oppressive environments for women and youngsters; the Catholic Church has reduced its efforts to control the beliefs, practices and private lives of its followers; both left and right wing parties have moderated their ideologies and their expectations of the political commitment of their members; and the nation itself has become a loose or common point of reference which allows for plural national identities in several regions (such as the Basque Country or Catalonia).
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Although it is evident that economic factors do play a role in the prolonged stay of children in their parents' home, it is also important that the structure, morals and inner workings of the family conform to a relatively egalitarian and non-authoritarian pattern. Decision-making in the family between 1966 and 1980 shows a clear tendency towards decisions made jointly by the husband and the wife in the following areas: visits to relatives and friends (up from 35% to 80%); expensive purchases (21% to 75%); calling the doctor in case of illness (26% to 70%); activities to be undertaken on holidays (26% to 80%); and expenditure on food (6% to 38%); with the wife making this decision alone in 54% of cases in 1980 (Garrido 1993: 98) . On the other hand, the normative consensus between parents and children seems to have increased in matters of religion, politics and morals (Elzo et alia 1994) , thus reducing the oppressive character of family life. Spanish families are thus fairly egalitarian in many respects; even so, the main burden of domestic work and care of sick members of the family falls primarily on wives and mothers.
The radical change in the relationship between church and state due to democratization has diminished the visibility and influence of the clergy in the public sphere. Secularization has also tended to reduce such influence in Spanish homes (particularly in matters of contraception, as the very low birth rates show). Thus, the effects of religion on Spaniards' public and private morals has lessened considerably, but what is being preached to them has also changed. From the late 1950s, within the ranks of the church, a sector of priests anxious to appeal to workers, periphery nationalists and young people with political ambitions, had been distancing themselves from the ideal of a confessional state and a thoroughly Catholic society, and were seeking a more tolerant morality and a more liberal economic and political environment. The orientation of the international church after the Vatican Council of 1962 came to place these trends center stage (Pérez-Díaz 1993: 140-183 ).
Commitment to a political party has also become less demanding, from the extreme of risking one's life to merely casting a vote. Today's left and right wing parties' stances are the result of long journeys of moderation and convergence towards the center. The communist party evolved from Leninism to euro-communism in the 1960s; the socialist party, from Marxism to a kind of social-democracy in the 1970s; and a handful of figures from the Francoist regime founded the party that has since developed into the center-right option. Centripetal competition may be expected to blur the ideational differences between the main center-right and center-left parties even more in the future.
Today, even national identities allow looser involvements. Spanish national symbols, such as flags or hymns (or the 'España, una, grande y libre' slogan ['Spain one, great and free']), were changed during the transition to democracy and their presence in everyday life has quickly declined. The 1978 Constitution was the starting point for the long term construction of a decentralized, quasi-federal administration, as well as the reconstruction (or even ex-novo construction, in some cases) of national traditions in the periphery of the country, which have gathered particular impetus in the Basque Country and Catalonia. This process has allowed a considerable proportion of Spanish citizens to allege plural identities, in which they combine regional, national and sometimes European sentiments (see infra).
Sentiments of trust
There is a widespread literature (in Spain and elsewhere) on stated verbal opinions of trust in a variety of social and political institutions, and in people, both leaders and fellow countrymen. On the basis of these indications (of 'vertical' and of 'horizontal' trust) general attitudes of trust or lack of trust are inferred, and then the countries are compared and the evolution of those attitudes is traced along a period of time. But, even though I may recognize the potential worth of these data, I will use these opinion data cum grano salis here, since, in my opinion, its significance depends on our ability to sort out two different elements underlying those verbal statements.
On the one hand, these statements can be the reiteration of the clichés, commonplaces or stereotypes which are current in the circles or communities the respondents belong to. They may want to show that they belong rightly to the group of reference, and repeat the appropriate statements ('morally' or 'politically' correct). If this is the case, the opinion polls would reflect the 'dominant moral or political discourse' of the age. And we may speculate that, in a country such as Spain, in which we find among the cultural elites a curious combination of the residues of the culture of traditional Catholicism and of the immoderate left, both making the point of the injustice of modern society, that 'dominant discourse' is pervaded by feelings of distrust to the morality of 'the world such as it is'. Expressions of trust, or lack of trust, may be then 'mere opinions'. On the other hand, these opinions may express (more or less) 'deep attitudes', but in this case, we may assume that they will be consistent with the 'revealed preferences' embodied in actual behavior: with values held and rules respected. Of course, one of the ways we may have to sort out these two elements is to combine opinion polls, observation of actual behavior and the analysis of the discourses of justification of people as they try to put together their verbal statements and their actual conduct. But short of this, I can only point at the problem and at the need to do research on it, and, in the meantime, to use the data selectively and put them into context.
In fact, the experiences of civil social linkages already referred to in the previous section are likely to bear an influence on the Spaniards' sentiments of confidence, belonging and obligation, which seem to be widespread according to recent public opinion polls. A survey carried out in April 1996 (CIS 1996c: 1) shows that 88% of the adult population thinks that 'there are basic rules to follow', and 91%, that 'in the long term it is better to be honest'; 87% believes that 'one can always find friends if one tries', and 70% disagrees with the idea that 'to get on well with other people it is necessary to pretend'; 63% states that they are not 'pessimistic regarding the future', and another 63% thinks that 'anybody can improve their standard of living if they really propose to do so'.
These feelings of trust and references to elementary rules of civil life are very likely to be reinforced by a feeling of belonging together to a national community, and maybe to a religious community; but in both cases emotional and symbolical references are of low intensity (at a level homologous to that of friend and family networks), so that these signs of belonging together are signs of reference to the rules but do not presuppose any intense militancy. These feelings of attachment may contribute to stability in a seemingly integrated and peaceful society (leaving aside the issue of Basque terrorism, even though even there has developed a fairly impressive peace movement during the nineties: Pérez-Díaz 1999b), in spite of the memory of a recent civil war and Spain's reputed historical inclination to violence (in fact, in the 19th century, civil wars were almost endemic in several areas of the country, and military pronunciamientos were frequent). Spain's suicide rate has remained very low (the second lowest in the world, ex-aequo with some other countries: 4 deaths per one hundred thousand inhabitants between 1989-1993; and so has her murder rate, at 1.2 per one hundred thousand inhabitants in the same period (Gaviria 1996: 387) .
In surveys, Spaniards express a relatively high degree of pride in being Spanish: 83% and 85% in 1981 and 1990 respectively. This is somewhat higher than other European peoples' pride in their nationality, with the European average standing at 76% and 77%). However, Spaniards' national identity coexists with strong local and regional identities (Orizo 1991; , especially in the case of the Basques and Catalans, a majority of whom usually declare their identity to be plural or shared (Pérez-Díaz 1999a). Furthermore, a Spanish identity is compatible with a strong Europeanist feeling on the one hand; while, on the other, it is notoriously lacking in any strong linkage to discourses of national exaltation, that were comprehensively delegitimized by their association with the Francoist state; or to any other form of aggressive or offensive nationalism. Even nationalism of a defensive nature is lacking, if we observe the general reluctance to undertake compulsory military service, leading towards the abolition of this institution.
As regards the significance of religion, an immense majority of Spaniards have continued to declare themselves Catholic over the last twenty years, which may tell us something about the permanence of religious feelings of a general character. However, the intensity of their religious observance, and their involvement in worship, and the organizational apparatus of the church have dropped dramatically. In 1970, 64% of adult Spaniards declared themselves practicing Catholics; 32%, non-practicing; and 3%, religiously indifferent or atheist; only 1% declared themselves to be followers of other religions. Curiously enough, the single percent of the last group did not vary in the following two decades: it was still about 1% in 1993. But in that year, practicing Catholics only amounted to 31%; non-practicing Catholics, to 54%; and the religiously indifferent or atheist, to 14%. The most important change had already taken place by the second half of the seventies, by the time of the transition to democracy, because the percentages for 1993 are quite similar to those for 1978 (Montero 1993: 180) .
Socioeconomic, cultural and political changes in the sixties and seventies brought about a redefinition of Catholics' attitudes towards their Church; causing not only a decrease in observance, but also a substantial reduction in religious vocations. Figures for the priesthood for 1992 (111,000) are similar to those for 1962 (126,000); however, the figures for newly ordained priests dropped from 825 in 1962 to 220 in 1992, and the number of seminarists decreased from 7,972 in 1962 7,972 in to 1,947 in 1992 7,972 in (INE 1970 INE 1996) ; once again, the main drop took place in the seventies.
A behavioral test of social cohesion: managing three structural strains
Adding these pieces of evidence together, scarce and fragmented as they may be, we get an overall impression that Spaniards feel they belong to a wider and often plural community with a bright future; they adhere to organizational objectives which have become less demanding with time; and they prefer informal social linkages and commitments rather than formal organizations, while establishing instrumental relationships when they do belong to the latter.
As a result, we are dealing with a peculiar type of social capital that is embedded in social associations which differ from most of the ones Putnam considers to be bearers of social capital (such as environmental organizations, football clubs, churches, unions, parent-teacher associations or fraternal groups). Furthermore, these associations also differ from the ones Durkheim envisaged as the pillars of modern organic societies: corporations. In his Division of social labour, Durkheim describes with a certain anxiety the emergence of a more fragmented but interdependent society, cemented on organic solidarity; he wishes to institutionalize this new type of solidarity in professional corporations of national or international dimensions suited to contemporary markets. In a society based on the interdependence of economic activities, professional interest groups would be expected to provide the moral discipline needed to avoid open conflicts of interests or anomie, as well as the main channel of communication between society and the state (Durkheim 1967 (Durkheim [1893 ).
In contrast to Durkheim's supposition that organic solidarity would need strong formal organizations of an 'old-corporatist' or a 'neocorporatist' kind to hold society together, the accumulation of this type of social capital in Spain in the second half of the century, without any such organizational pillars, has led to relative success in dealing with several demanding structural strains at the end of the century. Unemployment, the functioning of democracy and handling political scandals are three critical problems the Spanish society has faced in the last three decades (leaving aside the Basque question: Pérez-Díaz 1999a; 1999b) . I consider that finding a solution to these strains, or learning to live with them, are both evidence of the underlying presence of a relatively large amount of social capital of a civil kind, as expressed in the abovementioned soft forms of sociability and the formal associations themselves.
A) Unemployment
As a result of profound economic crises and erratic economic policies of adjustment to an open and more competitive market environment, the rates of unemployment in Spain have rocketed above those of any other Western European country, challenging her social stability. In contrast with the growth years of the sixties, the transition to democracy occurred during the economic crisis which began in 1973. Yet, even though recession continued well into the mid-eighties, and it was even deeper between 1991 and 1994, Spanish GDP in 1994 was 60% higher in real terms than it was in 1975, with only a slightly lower level of employment: 13.1 million employed in 1975 and 12.6 million in 1994 (BBV 1996 . Economic policy during these twenty years can be characterized as one of gradual adjustment to the new conditions created by Spain's integration into a more competitive global economy. A policy tradition centered upon curbing inflation has eventually evolved, first in a half-hearted way in the 1970s, and more energetically since the early 1980s (inflation, taken as the annual increase in the consumer price index, was 24% in 1977 and stands below 3% today). Spending policies have been more erratic, with continuous increases in public spending until the early nineties (up to 49.7% of GDP in 1993) and some restraint since then (46.9% in 1995) (BBV 1996: 274) .
Economic policy in general, on the part of both the center-right and center-left governments, has followed the pervasive philosophy of the main international organizations in this field, with the proviso of not antagonizing the unions. Massive inflows of foreign investment reinforced the policymakers' conviction that this was the right path (though a large chunk of this investment was used to finance the huge public debt, derived from excessive deficits as a result of the strategy to appease the unions). This economic policy tradition has included the privatization of many of the stateowned firms in the last five to six years (both by left-wing and right-wing governments), and the liberalization of the economy (of the capital and most of the product markets, and, more timidly, of the labor and the real estate markets).
This economic policy has been endorsed by the voters again and again, but it has given rise to the unexpected and undesired consequence of a spectacular increase in unemployment. Almost nonexistent under Francoism, and below 4% of the labor force at the arrival of democracy, it went up to 21% in 1985 , back down to 16% in 1991 , and up again to 23% in 1994 (European Commission 1996 in 1997 the rate stayed around 21%-22%. Unemployment is much higher among young people and women (45% and 31% respectively in 1994) . Though these data are the subject of controversy in Spain (see, for instance, Gaviria 1996), they have been obtained with methods that are similar to those of most Western countries. These rates might be reduced by as many as 3 or 4 percentage points if we took into account the underground economy (see also The Economist, May 3, 1997).
Leaving aside these small percentage differences, the big question remains the following: how is it possible for a society to live for ten to fifteen years with such a high unemployment rate and no serious disruption of the social fabric? The answer to this question may shed some light on the problems of the quantum and the quale of the available social capital. From the viewpoint of this paper, the answer entails three components: one is related to the welfare state, another to the role played by the unions, and the third (and fundamental one) to the institution of the family (Pérez-Díaz 1999a: 103-121).
First, a significant extension of the welfare state has provided compensation or prevention mechanisms: unemployment subsidies (which have covered around half the registered unemployed), schooling (which has delayed youngsters' entry into the labor market: the number of university students, for instance, has trebled since 1975), and financial help to other members of the family of the unemployed (retirement or invalidity pensions, with an increase in the number of beneficiaries and in the per capita amount received).
Second, unions (which mainly represent the interests of the workers with stable contracts) have successfully resisted measures that would have made the labor market more flexible, and would have allowed business adjustments to demand and costs via wages. Moreover, the unions have managed to delegitimize alternative discourses that could have articulated and justified a strategy suitable for young people that would have aimed at this kind of adjustment; and they have been able to prevent the consolidation of such a discourse precisely by appealing to the value of solidarity. This distraction and confusion of young people is still meeting with considerable success. Third, the relative success of the above mechanisms (the welfare state and union strategies) has depended on their compatibility with families' strategies. A tacit compromise based on intergenerational and inter-gender solidarity has developed within families. According to this, women have accepted a slow and gradual entry into the labor market in worse conditions than male workers. The female activity rate remained at a level of 41%-45% of women aged between 16 and 65 years in 1990-1994 (it was around 75% for male workers), and the percentage of women in fixedterm contracts was 38% (and 31% for male workers). Young people have accepted they will undergo the combined experience of unemployment (around 45% of the labor force aged under 25) (European Commission 1996: 92, 192 ) and fixedterm contracts (more than 90% of the contracts signed since 1984). In exchange, women and youngsters have shared an assortment of family incomes (wages, pensions, unemployment benefits), the family flat or house, and a sense of togetherness with the male (usually employed) heads of household and the rest of the family. The family has gathered resources together from (almost) all its members and redistributed them, apparently according to individual needs. Thus it appears to have helped to reduce the level of conflict between generations and genders; or, at the very least, it has postponed these conflicts.
B) The functioning of democracy
Although a majority of Spaniards claim to have scant interest in politics and a certain resistance towards the political class, the fact is that the high electoral turnout, the relative stability of the party system after two turnover elections, and permanent public support for democracy and the party system are evidence of a consolidated political system. Electoral participation has remained fairly high, especially if we take into account the high frequency of elections and the voluntary character of the ballot. Abstention in general elections averaged 26% of the electorate, with higher rates in the second half of the eighties than in the hardfought polls of the nineties. (When the socialist party enjoyed a comfortable majority in Parliament, abstentions in 1986 and 1989 approached 30%.) Abstention rates in regional elections have varied considerably: for instance, in Catalonia, the lowest rate was 36% and the highest 46% (with polls in 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1995) . Abstention rates in the five local elections to date went from a low of 30% to a high of 40%; and in the three elections to the European Parliament, from 32% to 45% (lower levels than those of France and the Netherlands, and similar to those of Germany) (Castillo 1994: 389ff.; Justel 1994: 90 ; Anuarios El País, several years).
Workers Party) and another on the center-right, flanked by a leftist party (the Communist Party, now leading the coalition Izquierda Unida, United Left), and several nationalist parties (above all, the coalition Convergència i Unió, CiU, Convergence and Union, in Catalonia; and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV, Basque Nationalist Party, in the Basque Country). In general terms, the vote for the whole of the left and for nationalist parties has remained stable. The acute crisis and eventual disappearance of UCD at the beginning of the eighties may have reflected the disenchantment of its constituency with the intense factionalism within the party leadership. Its successor in the electoral space of the center-right, Alianza Popular (People's Alliance), later to become the Partido Popular (People's Party), PP, went from 26% of the vote in 1982 to 39% in 1996.
Public support for democracy and the party system has been permanent. Levels of support for democracy as a legitimate political regime, preferable to any other alternative, have usually remained high (around 80% of the responses in surveys of the adult population). Most Spaniards declare themselves satisfied with the present functioning of democracy, with percentages that range from 40%-45% in the early eighties to 50%-70% in the early nineties. Despite low levels of affiliation, the public regards the parties as indispensable for democracy. Formulated in different ways in surveys ('without parties there is no democracy', 'thanks to the parties people can participate in political life', or 'parties are necessary to defend the interests of the different groups [in society]'), this judgement has remained stable at a level of 60%-70% of the responses between 1980 and 1992 (Justel 1992: 83) .
The percentage of adults who declared themselves well-informed on political matters varied from 24% and 31% between 1980 and 1989. This may mean that Spaniards' confidence in their civic competence has increased: those who stated they understood political matters (or rather disagreed with the phrase 'politics is so complicated that people like me cannot understand it') went up from 22% to 36% in the same period (Justel 1992) ; while in 1996, 37% of the adult population declared that they understood 'the most important political issues of the country rather well' (CIS 1996b: 6) . However, there has not been a parallel increase in a feeling of political influence: in 1996, only 24% thought that the average citizen had much influence on political life (CIS 1996b: 6) .
The sensation of lack of influence is coherent with an ambivalent feeling towards parties and the political class. On one hand, the latter are voted in and considered to be indispensable (see supra). On the other, people think that politicians are unresponsive to citizens: that 'politicians are not concerned about what people [like the interviewee] think' (65% agreed with this sentence in 1989: CIS 1990a), and that public representatives 'do not make any effort to fulfill the promises they make during campaigns' (60% agreed with that in 1996: CIS 1996b).
Given all that, people logically declared a rather low interest in politics. The number of people who 'talk frequently' about politics seems to have dropped from 15% to 9% between 1981 and 1990 (Orizo 1991: 150) . Those who stated they had 'a lot' or 'quite a lot' of interest in politics stayed at a level of 22%-24% between 1988 and 1996. Apparently, politics aroused positive feelings among 25%-29% of the adult population, negative feelings among 4%, and indifference among 55%-64%) (Orizo 1991: 150) . If we focus on the young, their declared interest was lower in the eighties, after democracy had been consolidated (11% and 18% in surveys of 1982 and 1989) , than in the sixties, before the arrival of democracy (21% and 19% in surveys of 1960 and 1965) , with a high point during the critical transition years (1975) (1976) (1977) when young people who said they were interested in politics reached levels of 30% to 45% (Navarro 1993: 125) .
C) Political scandals
In the nineties, political and financial scandals occupied the center of the public space. These included scandals connected with state terrorism, illegal financing of the political parties, and insider trading and other forms of corruption. Firstly, it seemed that prominent members of the state apparatus were part of a plot which led to the assassination of 28 terrorists, or alleged terrorists, between 1983 and 1987; that they had planned or given the green light for this, made public funds available, and then covered it up. (The minister and the under-secretary of the Ministry of the Interior at the time stood trial in connection with these crimes and were found guilty by the Supreme Court in July 1998.) Secondly, proof was supplied that the different parties (particularly the socialist party then in power) had systematically engaged in the illegal funding of their activities, probably since the beginning of the transition, and that they had deliberately broken the laws forbidding these practices that they themselves had made. (In the most important of these cases, the FILESA affair, several members of parliament and business men were sent to jail.) Thirdly, it became equally obvious that insider trading, tax evasion and false accounting, and massive bribery in the adjudication of public works had been common practice for a fairly long time, and certainly during the long tenure in office of the socialist party (since 1982), to such an extent that some high profile businessmen and public officials (including the Governor of the Bank of Spain, and the Director General of the Guardia Civil) went too far. After four years of unremitting scandal (and partly as a result of it) there was a change of government and a number of judiciary proceedings were initiated.
Even though the nature of the scandals varied, they were all to do with the definition and implementation of the game rules that affected the accountability of the elites: of politicians to the electorate; of entrepreneurs to their shareholders; and of both before the law. In this regard, these scandals provide us with three important insights.
First, they shed light on the tacit rules of the patron-client networks which operated within an illdefined establishment. This comprised financial circles and the entire political spectrum, particularly the center-left (which was in power between 1982 and 1996), large segments of the state civil and police apparatus, and a number of medium-size and small entrepreneurs, but it could be traced right down to the innumerable practices of corruption and cheating of the welfare system by more minor people. This could be interpreted as a pathological development of a traditional pattern, under the stimulus of the new financial and political conditions of the 1980s (the buoyance of the financial markets and the sense of impunity of the party in power). With the exception of state terrorism, the process is similar to others observed in France, Italy, Germany or Japan (and with different political parties).
Second, these practices were checked neither by the parties nor by other associations (unions and churches, for instance), but by the combined actions of some judges (in the spirit of the Italian mani pulite) and journalists.
Third, judges and journalists were able to mobilize public opinion. The reason why can be traced to two factors. Firstly, we have already noted the public's ambivalence towards the political class; this made it sensitive to the issue of political accountability. Secondly, the public was also increasingly sensitive to the more general problem of law and order. Already in the eighties, between 1982 and 1987, there was an increase in the numbers of those who declared that: 'we should obey the law even if this runs counter to our own interest' (from 61% to 65%); 'personal circumstances are not an excuse to break the law' (from 53% to 58%); 'we should tell the truth before a judge irrespective of the consequences' (from 65% to 70%); and 'most criminals get away unpunished' (from 53% to 66%) (CIS 1988) . This evolution of public sentiment took place against a background of perceived increasing insecurity: between 1978 and 1996 the number of people who had been victims of a crime (at some point in their lives) rose from 11% to 46% (CIS 1978; 1996a) .
Living with widespread unemployment, building a new democratic regime, and purging the state of corrupt and criminal practices are three difficult tests that Spanish society has recently faced up to with a modicum of endurance and a certain amount of success. Although I am deliberately overlooking the normative conflicts that underlie these tests, I take it that the ability to manage these structural strains is an indication of the level and civic quality of the social capital present at diverse levels of this society.
Concluding remarks: The ironies of civil and uncivil transformations
The Spanish case illustrates the complexity of the topic of social capital. We are not only dealing with social capital in general, but with a number of drastically different kinds. We have the civil kind of social capital attuned to the solidarity of extended orders (that Durkheim called 'organic solidarity'); but then, we may find social capital also of a civil kind connected with the rules, the networks and the sentiments of 'enterprise associations' (in Oakeshott's terms; and corresponding with a 'civil variety' of Durkheim's 'mechanical solidarity'), provided that their ideational contents as well as their internal rules make them compatible with a civil society. Thus, organizations of all sorts (churches, unions, political parties, societal associations, social movements and others, including economic firms) may be of a civil or an uncivil kind; 12 they may even have various 'degrees of civility'. They may transform themselves from a civil to an uncivil form, and viceversa. For instance, churches, parties and unions acting in the Spanish civil war were rather of an uncivil kind; yet, most of them behave in a civil manner, and demonstrated a basic civil character, by the time of the democratic transition.
In other words, those associations, and the whole of a country, may move from one situation in which there is a plethora of an uncivil kind of social capital to another in which social capital of a civil kind prevails. We can call this a 'civilizing process', using the terms of Norbert Elias (1983: 339-44) . The opposite may equally well happen (as indeed it did in Spain between about 1900 and 1930, and specially after the 1910s). But the Spanish case suggests that the ways from 'un-civil' to 'civil' may be baroque and unintended. The second phase of Francoism may be read as an illustration of this. In a sense both Francoist elites and anti-Francoist dissidents were, to a point, brother-enemies, following a long-standing Spanish tradition. By this I mean that their cognitive, moral and emotional orientations in regard to the need for a strong, authoritative assertion of their views of what a 'good society' should be were not that dissimilar. In a sense, they were all 'clerics' or 'the faithful in need of clerics', who were used to authoritative preaching and enjoyed it in all its various guises, right-wing or left-wing, truly religious or halfsecular and half-millenarian; and they tended or tried to behave in the manner of strong and disciplined organizations.
However, the 'cunning of reason', through the workings of markets, consumerism, economic growth, outside influence, generational change and other mechanisms, converted them into tame, domesticated, 'civilized' specimens, ready to live and let live. This was accomplished not because of any self-reflective and explicit change in the ideational contents of the formal associations they had joined in the fifties, the sixties and seventies that then led Spaniards along the road of moderation; because the 'ideologies' of those associations were far from being 'moderate'. Their 'civilization' was due, rather, to the sheer fact of coming together, electing their leaders, bargaining with each other as well as with their adversaries, trying to enlarge their social bases by persuasion and marking time waiting for the big bang (namely, Franco's death) to happen; in the meantime, they were getting used to the background of those aforementioned factors: the markets, economic growth, outside influence, generational change. In other words, it was, above all, the 'tacit wisdom' (by analogy with Michael Polanyi's 'tacit knowledge' : Polanyi 1967) embodied in the practice and (in time) in habits of tolerance, and in an attitude of live and let live that made those changes possible and led to the transformation of uncivil social capital into a civil one.
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When liberal democracy came at last, we find that a stock of social capital of the civil kind had already been accumulated. This was a reservoir of goodwill on which the political and social leaders of the late 1970s would draw in order to make the democratic transition and consolidation successful.
At the same time, the Spanish case has also shown that, for the twenty years or so following the transition, even social capital of a civil kind may adopt various forms and allow for various patterns of sociability and association. Thus, what we find now is not so much an explosion of new associations or the growth of those already existing, but rather the development of a pattern of soft forms of sociability around the family, family-centered networks and peer-groups, as well as 'occasional' associations. The latter are formed when people come together in order to transform an event into a ceremonial display and an exaltation of a communitas (Turner 1974) , that is lacking, or almost lacking, in any instrumental orientation, as is demonstrated by the remarkable rise in the frequency and importance of local fiestas (during this period) which procure the direct (and often intense) participation of increasing numbers of people.
There is also some irony in that these transformations from 'civil' to 'uncivil' forms of social capital (and viceversa) , and these variations between 'organic' and 'mechanical' forms of solidarity, suggest a revision of sorts of most of the conventional wisdom regarding the transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' societies. Soft patterns of sociability, family-centered networks and the fiesta culture suggest the resilience of the cultural forms 12 For an elaboration of the argument in regard to the 'civility' of the firm see Pérez-Díaz (1999c) . 13 For a more detailed analysis of the combined changes in actual practices and in the ideational contents of the Catholic Church, see Pérez-Díaz (1993: 108-183) .
of the corporate villages of pre-modern times and, more generally, of the bilateral nature of Northern Mediterranean kinship (Pitt-Rivers 1977: 72ff.) . This allowed for significant autonomy on the part of the family unit as well as for an important stock of social capital (of a civil kind of sorts) leading to a significant degree of social stability at the local level, which lasted for about two millennia in many parts of the region. Moreover, at least in the case of corporate villages such as those of Castile, their solidarity was not reduced to its mechanical form, since they could accommodate economic, social and symbolic markets of some importance, and maintain complex and elaborate ties with the outside world. For all its limits, this form of rural life was, in many respects, more 'civil' than the forms of life existing in the modern urban world of ideological politics, authoritarian parties and unions, and fanatic and well-organized churches that have, all too often, come afterwards. 14 Of course, any situation at any time shows light and darkness, and has its potentials and its limits, as corresponds to a mix of social capitals of various kinds, civil and uncivil. At this point in the late 1990s, the accumulated stock of social capital, all components considered, has provided for significant social cohesion. A social fabric of networks and associations together with sentiments of social trust have gone hand in hand with a mellowing of the normative conflicts of the past, This has allowed the country to meet the challenge posed by some significant structural strains. Spain has lived with a huge unemployment problem apparently compatible with a modicum of social cohesion and a hopeful mood (which in the late 1990s seems in the process of being significantly reduced thanks to a wave of economic prosperity). Her democratic institutions are well and alive, at least in comparative terms; and the country is seemingly getting through a crisis in the application of the rule of law to its political class (not to speak of the ordeal imposed on so many by terrorism), for which there is a fifty/fifty chance of either to end well or to follow the path of dubious compromises, incremental progress and periodic reversal to illegal/semi-legal party funding and other abuses other Western polities (such as France, Germany, Italy and Belgium, for instance, among others) seem used to.
Of course, in the end, the mix of civil and uncivil potential is always there, in today's Spain, as in any other historical location. Civil societies are fragile institutional and cultural constructs, and the more we engage ourselves along the path of translating those constructs into reality, of 'building' them, the more we realize that their foundations rest on shifting grounds. They are the shifting grounds of the coming generations to be socialized anew, and of the deep layers of authoritarianism, ressentiment or fear of liberty which may be part of the character of the old (and new) generations and which may be (at least, partly) favored by established practices and institutions (which bear witness to a long standing tradition of 'mechanical solidarity' of an uncivil kind).
Finally, our discussion suggests that politics plays a crucial, albeit rather ambiguous, role in the process of development of civil kinds of social capital and the transformation from uncivil to civil kinds of social capital. It can help or hinder these changes, and it is as likely to do so on purpose as (more often) unintentionally.
Thus, in the Spain of the 1930s, many political actors polarized society, and apparently succeeded in transforming conflicts of interests and normative conflicts between various groups into a civil war. In the process of doing so, as well as tearing apart the social fabric of the national community, they furthered the development of social capital of an uncivil kind, and depleted the stock of a civil kind. In the late 1950s, and throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, political actors of various hues, both Francoists and anti-Francoists, helped to reverse the previous process, mostly unintentionally. This culminated in the setting up of an institutional framework of a liberal democracy complete with a market economy, social pluralism and a culture of tolerance.
It is worth noticing, however, a further ironical twist. At the moment of the democratic transition, leaders of the state, parties, unions, interest groups and church became the protagonists of the events. Nevertheless, much to the surprise of all these political and social leaders, once the framework was fully in place, social capital continued to flow but through channels different from the ones they expected. Affiliation to these various organizations was low and most of the energy and resources went into soft forms of sociability and semi-formal networks instead; and now, the leaders of these formal associations (the state, as much as the church and political parties) are actually being driven to recognize this development, and accommodate 14 See Pérez-Díaz (1991). themselves to it.
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